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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Although agency is not itself a form of business entity, the implications of agency 
doctrine are inescapable in explaining how entities “get things done”1 with concrete or legal 
consequences, in particular in interactions with persons situated externally to the entity. More 
broadly,  agency law is foundational to any entity, furnishing as it does the bases on which the 
law ascribes consequences to conferrals of power and authority within any organization.2 This 
Chapter focuses more narrowly on agency law’s external aspects, that is, the bases on which an 
actor’s conduct has legally-salient consequences for a firm that the actor represents in dealing 
with third parties. Principals often argue, after the fact, that an agent acted without authority and 
that the agent’s action should not carry legal consequences for the principal. Across legal 
systems, agency law addresses these arguments through doctrines that bear some similarities but 
also differ in significant respects.3 All systems, though, draw a fundamental distinction between 
binding the principal on the basis that the agent acted with actual authority, consistently with a 
                                                
*David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke University. I served as the Reporter for the 
Restatement (Third) of Agency (2006) but this Chapter, unlike the Restatement, is not a 
publication of the American Law Institute.  
 
1Ribstein et al. at 8. 
2Orts at 54. 
3Danny Busch & Laura J. Macgregor, Comparative Law Evaluation, in BUSCH & 
MACGREGOR at 386 et seq. 
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reasonable interpretation of the principal’s expressed or known wishes, as opposed to other bases 
for attribution, such as apparent authority. This chapter uses the perspective afforded by the 
common law of agency to assess issues about external agency in connection with alternative 
business entities, in particular general and limited partnerships and limited liability companies 
(LLCs). Although partnerships and partnership statutes are not recent phenomena, ongoing 
controversies and confusion surround the bases for external agency within LLCs. Focusing on 
common-law agency can add clarity in understanding the underlying concepts and terminology 
as well as in specifying the relationships between statutory provisions and the general law.  
 The chapter begins by examining long-established elements of general partnership law 
through which partners are able to take action with legal consequences for the partnership. The 
agency concept uniquely characteristic of partnership law—termed by the chapter the “positional 
power” held by partners concerning matters within the partnership’s ordinary business—is 
related to but distinct from the doctrinal fundamentals of common-law agency, in particular, the 
robust doctrine of apparent authority. The chapter next turns to the bases under LLC statutes 
through which an LLC member or manager may bind the LLC. LLC statutes vary markedly 
among jurisdictions—contrasting sharply with common-law agency and partnership law—and 
agency-related doctrines are unsettled in some jurisdictions, in particular, Delaware. This 
confusion surprises some observers, who “thought this was so simple....”4 At least some of the 
muddle may stem from statutory terminology, as well as from confusion about foundational 
common-law concepts. The chapter demonstrates that statutory confusion is not inevitable and, 
additionally, may be mitigated by judicial opinions as well as by expert consensus among legal 
                                                
4Frost at 47. 
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advisors.          
 
2.  GENERAL PARTNERSHIP AND A GENERAL PARTNER’S POSITIONAL POWER  
General partnership 
 Partnership statutes define a partner’s capacity to bind the partnership, using the language 
of successive uniform acts. Under section 9 of the original Uniform Partnership Act 
(1914)(UPA), every partner “is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business ....” 
This delimits the scope of a partner’s agency position to actions that serve the partnership’s 
“purpose” and its “business,” and, additionally under section 9, by whether the partner’s act was 
“for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership ....”5 If so, the 
partner’s act “binds the partnership ....” However, section 9 also recognizes that a partner may, as 
to any particular act, lack “authority” conferred by fellow partners (just as any agent may lack 
actual authority conferred by the principal), for example as a consequence of a restriction or limit 
imposed by the partnership agreement. Section 9 reconciles the possibility that a partner may 
deal with a third party by acting without actual authority but by also “apparently carrying on in 
the usual way the business of the partnership” by looking to the state of knowledge of the party 
with whom the partner dealt: the partnership is bound unless the third party “has knowledge of 
the fact that” the partner lacks authority. Thus, as to third parties who lack such knowledge, a 
partner’s unauthorized act binds the partnership when the act and the partner’s manner of acting 
satisfy the criteria prescribed in section 9. By acting without authority the partner acted 
wrongfully toward the partnership and, like any agent whose unauthorized conduct binds the 
                                                
5A corollary of this limit is the implication stemming from section 18(e) that a unanimous 
vote of all partners is necessary to authorize a non-ordinary transaction. Ribstein et al. at 129.  
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principal, the partner would be subject to liability to the partnership.6 
 Eighty years on, the 1997 successor to the original Uniform Partnership Act changed 
little of relevance. Section 301 of the 1997 statute (“RUPA”) replaces “the usual way” limitation 
with “in the ordinary course,” and, more substantively, provides that a partnership is not bound 
by a partner’s unauthorized act when the third party “knew or had received a notification that” 
the partner lacked authority to bind the partnership through the act.7 More significantly, although 
a partnership may file in public records a statement of authority concerning some or all of the 
partners, persons who are not partners are deemed to know of limits on a partner’s authority only 
when the limits concern authority to transfer real property held in partnership name, and then 
only when a certified copy of the filed statement is on record “in the office for recording 
transfers of real property.”8 Filed therein, the statement is likely to come to the attention of the 
transferee or the transferee’s lawyer. Thus, apart from transfers of real property, third parties 
dealing with a partner are not deemed to know of privately-imposed or otherwise unknown limits 
                                                
6Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.09 cmt. b. If a partner purports to have authority to 
bind the partnership but the partner’s act does not bind it, the partner may be subject to liability 
to the third party for breaching an implied warranty of authority. See id. § 6.10.  
 
7As RUPA defines the term, a notification is given by “taking steps reasonably required 
to inform another person in ordinary course,” and is received when the notification comes to the 
recipient’s attention or is “duly delivered” either to the recipient’s place of business or to another 
place held out by that person to receive communications. RUPA § 102 (c) & (d). RUPA also 
drops the specification of acts that are presumptively unauthorized contained in UPA section 
9(3). The list may have been helpful, although admittedly some of its items were outdated, such 
as the power to “[s]ubmit a partnership claim or liability to reference in arbitration.” Unif. 
Partnership Act § 9(3)(e). The other presumptively unauthorized acts were assigning partnership 
property “in trust for creditors or on the assignee’s promise to pay the debts of the partnership;” 
disposing of the partnership’s business good will; doing any other act “which would make it 
impossible to carry on the ordinary business” of the partnership; and confessing a judgment. For 
the proposition that the list added predictability, which was helpful, see Ribstein et al. at 130. 
 
8Id. § 303(d)(e). 
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imposed on the partner’s authority.  
Positional power 
 Although the statutory treatment of partners as agents resembles aspects of the common 
law of agency, the common law is not identical to partnership law. As a consequence, the 
terminology of “power” better captures the capacity to bind the firm conferred by statute on 
partners than does the terminology of “authority.” “Power,” a broader term, encompasses in this 
context the possibility that it may be exercised without the right to do so.9  Partnership statutes, 
like the common law, recognize that actual authority (and ratification, which creates actual 
authority after the fact) is not the sole basis for attributing the legal consequences of an agent’s 
act to the principal.10 When a partner acts without actual authority, by statute a third party may 
bind the partnership when the partner appeared to act in the ordinary course of partnership 
business and the third party did not know and had not received a notification that the partner 
lacked authority. The basis for binding the partnership, in other words, derives from the partner’s 
status or position as a partner, subject to stated limits, including the third party’s knowledge, and 
not from communications or other manifestations about authority made by the partnership, 
whether to the partner, a particular third party, or a broader audience, including manifestations 
made through a title assigned to the partner that is generally understood to encompass authority 
of a particular type and scope.  
 The analysis is not the same within common-law agency. Unless the principal has ratified 
                                                
9Bishop & Kleinberger ¶ 7.05[1] at 7-41. 
10Formally defined, “[a]n agent acts with actual authority when, at the time of taking 
action that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance 
with the principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act.” 
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.01.  
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an agent’s unauthorized act, a third party seeking to hold the principal to the act’s legal 
consequences would turn to the doctrine of apparent authority. An agent’s apparent authority 
stems from a manifestation made by the principal; the principal is bound when the third party 
reasonably believes the agent (or other actor) has authority to act on behalf of the principal and 
that belief is traceable to a manifestation of the principal.11 Apparent authority looks outward, to 
the principal’s manifestations, their connection to the third party, and the reasonableness (or not) 
of the third party’s belief. Apparent authority is not an inward-focused doctrine grounded in the 
principal’s relationship to the agent, as is a partner’s statutory power to bind the partnership. 
 To be sure, it’s understandable that a partner’s statutory power to bind might be 
characterized as an instance of “apparent authority”12 when it diverges from actual authority. The 
statutory language itself refers to “apparently” carrying on partnership business in the usual way, 
and a third party with knowledge or on notice that a partner lacks authority may not bind the 
partnership (unless it ratifies the partner’s act), just as a third party on notice that an agent lacks 
authority may not rely on apparent authority to bind the principal. But a third party seeking to 
hold a partnership need show no manifestation made by the partnership that underpinned the 
third party’s belief that the partner had authority. More narrowly (and more theoretically), a 
partner may have actual authority on the basis of the partner’s status as a partner plus the absence 
                                                
11Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 (“[a]pparent authority is the power held by an 
agent or other actor to affect a principal’s legal relations with third parties when a third party 
reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is 
traceable to the principal’s manifestations.”). 
 
12For this usage, see Ribstein et al. at 127 (referring to “the scope of the partners’ 
apparent authority, at least to the extent that third parties are not notified of any limitation on the 
partners’ power”). More guardedly, RULLCA’s drafters state that UPA (1914) “codified a 
particular form of apparent authority by position ....” RULLCA, Prefatory Note at 3 & § 301, 
cmt. a (UPA “codifies the common law notion of apparent authority by position ....”). 
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of any relevant restriction or limitation in the partnership agreement, but with no separate or 
discrete manifestation conferring authority from the partnership to that partner. 
 Of course, a partnership may act through agents who are not its partners. Non-partner 
agents may be situated internally as firm employees, such as a business manager or an associate 
lawyer in a law firm that is organized as a partnership, or externally, such as an external 
investment manager or broker. Whether the acts of a non-partner agent bind the partnership is 
not resolved by partnership law, but by general common-law agency. However, partnership law 
itself, and the partnership agreement, determine whether a partner binds the partnership by 
engaging a particular actor as an agent. For example, if an individual partner, acting contrary to 
the partnership agreement, engaged the “agent,” UPA section 9 and RUPA section 301 require 
inquiry into whether the partner’s action constituted “apparently carrying on in the usual way” 
(or the ordinary course) the partnership’s business, and whether the “agent” knew or had 
received a notification that the partner lacked authority to engage her on behalf of the 
partnership.13    
Inherent agency power 
 For these reasons, the terminology of “positional power” more cleanly specifies partners’ 
position as agents and differentiates them from common-law agency.14 For some scholars, the 
closest point of comparison within general agency law is likely be the doctrine of inherent 
                                                
13Agency law is also relevant to defining supervisory authority over an entity’s 
employees. See RULLCA, Prefatory Note at 4.  
 
14Referring to the power as “positional” is clearer than “partnership power;” an agent 
who acts with apparent authority but not actual authority exercises a power but one stemming 
from manifestations made by the principal, not the agent’s status or relationship to the principal.  
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agency power,15 introduced as a formal proposition in Restatement (Second) of Agency but 
jettisoned by Restatement (Third). Intended to protect third parties from the unfairness that 
would result if an enterprise “could have the benefit of the work of its agents without making it 
responsible to some extent for their excesses and failures to act carefully,”16 inherent agency 
power applied when no other basis for attribution sufficed to hold the principal.17 It cut across a 
broad and variegated swath—encompassing the liability of principals (whether disclosed or 
undisclosed18) when agents with general managerial responsibility overstep privately-imposed 
limits on authority, as well as an employer’s liability for torts of employees committed within the 
scope of employment—and was formulated at a level of generality that did not identify the 
normative principle that justified the principal’s liability. As one scholar summarized, inherent 
agency power was an ontological concept, not a normative principle.19  
 Viewed more instrumentally, inherent agency power for the most part responded to the 
narrowness with which Restatement Second formulated other agency doctrines, in particular,  
apparent authority. In more historical or theoretical terms, as I’ve written elsewhere, inherent 
                                                
15See Bishop & Kleinberger ¶ 7.05[2] at 7-43.  
16Restatement (Second) of Agency §8A, cmt. a. 
17Id. § 8A (“the power of an agent which is derived not from authority, actual authority or 
estoppel, but solely for the agency relation and exists for the protection of persons harmed by or 
dealing with a servant or other agent”). 
 
18When a principal is undisclosed, a third party has no notice that the agent is acting for a 
principal. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.04 (2)(b). A principal is “unidentified” when the 
third party has notice that the agent acts for a principal but does not have notice of the principal’s 
identity. Id. § 1.04(2)(c). In earlier terminology, an unidentified principal was a “partially 
disclosed” principal. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 4(2) (criticizing term as less accurate 
than “unidentified principal.”).    
 
19For this critique, see McMeel. 
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agency power may have represented an interim response to early challenges to the intellectual 
merit of agency as a “‘proper title in the law.’”20 As a free-standing doctrine, inherent agency 
power risked outcomes in transactional contexts in which a third party on notice of limits on an 
agent’s authority would nevertheless be able to bind a disclosed principal.21 In any event, as a 
doctrinal formulation, inherent agency power operated only one-way, that is, to bind the 
principal at the behest of a third party. A partner’s statutory or positional power, in contrast, 
operates bilaterally, to bind both the partnership and the third party with whom the partner dealt. 
And neither the text of Restatement (Second), nor the available history, relies on partnership law 
for an instance of inherent agency power.22      
3. AGENCY AND THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
 Within the menagerie of business forms, the limited liability company (LLC) is “a 
relatively new, hybrid form of business entity that combines the liability shield of a corporation 
with the federal tax classification of a partnership.”23 LLCs (like corporations) are formed under 
                                                
20DeMott at __(quoting doubts of Oliver Wendell Holmes). 
21The theoretical possibility was realized in Menard, Inc. v. Dage-MTI, Inc., 726 N.E.2d 
1206, 1208 (Ind. 2000). 
 
22For an account of that history, see DeMott. The drafter of the original Uniform 
Partnership Act, exploring its history, did not examine specifics of the fit between partners’ 
agency powers and common-law agency but did discuss the impact of a partner’s death on the 
agency capacity of the surviving partners plus whether partners were to be viewed as agents of a 
legal entity or as co-principals (and agents) on an aggregate account of partnership. Lewis at 638, 
639. Partnership makes a brief appearance in Restatement (Second) of Agency, in which § 8A 
repeats the definition in UPA § 6 (“an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-
owners a business for profit”).  
 
23Bishop & Kleinberger ¶ 1.01[1] at 1-7 (footnotes omitted). 
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state law; unlike general partnership law, LLC law is far from uniform.24 LLC statutes vary in 
many ways, including the circumstances under which the LLC is bound by the unauthorized act 
of a member or manager of the LLC. LLC statutes also vary in the clarity with which they 
address agency-related issues, including the statute’s relationship to the common law; at times 
some statutes have been explicitly disconnected from the common law in basic respects, while 
some statutory formulations are confused.  
 The confusion may stem from the history of LLC legislation and from drafters’ reliance 
on partnership statutes. From early days, LLCs could elect to be managed by their members 
(resembling in this respect a general partnership) or centrally by managers. LLCs from early 
days also contemplated the execution of two documents: (1) an organizational form to be 
submitted for filing with the secretary of state or another official designated by the state, like the 
document and filing requisite for a corporation or a limited partnership; and (2) an internal 
agreement, not filed with the state, often termed an operating agreement or limited liability 
company agreement (which many statutes do not require to be reduced to writing) and which 
resembles a partnership agreement.25 Early concerns centered on achieving tax classification for 
LLCs as partnerships, likely prompting some of the agency-related provisions in LLC statutes. 
The tax concerns were obviated in 1997 by a “check-the-box” regime for unincorporated 
domestic entities that do not issue publicly-traded interests, which enables each  entity to choose 
its own tax treatment. Regardless, and returning to the metaphor of the menagerie of business 
                                                
24As of late summer 2014, seven states plus the Virgin Islands had adopted the Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act (1996). Seven states plus the District of Columbia had adopted 
the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (2006). 
 
25And the Delaware statute now excludes the applicability of the state’s general statute of 
frauds. See  Del. Code Ann., tit. 18-101(7).  
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forms, viewed from the perspective of agency-related characteristics, many LLC statutes house 
the new entity either in close proximity to partnerships, not incorporated entities, or in a distant 
enclosure away from the menagerie’s other inhabitants.     
Positional powers under LLC statutes   
 In some LLC statutes, provisions comparable to the language in partnership statutes 
specify the position of members and managers as agents. For example, under section 301 of the 
Uniform LLC Act (ULLCA)(1996), “each member is an agent of the limited liability company 
for the purpose of its business” and the member’s act “for apparently carrying on in the ordinary 
course the company’s business” binds the LLC, unless the member lacked authority so to act for 
the LLC and the third party “knew or had notice” that the member lacked authority. But—and in 
contrast to a default-rule general partnership—centralized management is an express and formal 
statutory option for LLC structures. Under ULLCA, when an LLC is manager-managed, “a 
member is not an agent of the company for the purpose of its business solely by reason of being 
a member.”26 Each manager is an agent for the purpose of the LLC’s business, subject to the 
same limitations applicable to a member’s agency power in a member-managed LLC.27 ULLCA  
requires that the articles for an LLC specify whether it is to be manager-managed,28 which could 
enable third parties to make this basic determination about any LLC with which they may deal. 
Along the same lines, when an entity is a limited, not a general partnership, only the general 
                                                
26ULLCA § 301(b)(1). 
27ULLCA § 301 (b)(1). 
28ULLCA § 203 (a)(6). 
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partner holds the positional powers of an agent;29 a limited partner, in the terminology of the 
most recent uniform act, “does not have the right or power as a limited partner to act for or bind 
the entity.”30 Reasonable third parties, that is, who know they deal with a limited partnership or a 
manager-managed LLC, are assumed to be aware that other members or partners are not 
positioned as agents simply through their status in the firm. However, to determine whether an 
LLC is manager-managed may require inquiry into the public record of the firm’s filed articles 
of association because LLC law does not require that the firm use a name that would reveal its 
management structure,31 in contrast to limited partnership law.32   
The impact of restrictions on authority in operating agreements 
 Unlike ULLCA and partnership statutes, some LLC statutes may create the possibility 
that provisions in LLC agreements that limit the authority of members or managers could be 
operative as against third parties who do not know or have notice of the restrictions. If so, LLC 
law clashes with common-law agency doctrine. The doctrine of apparent authority protects third 
parties who act reasonably on the basis of principals’ manifestations about their agents; the 
underlying point is that “[a] principal may not choose to act through agents whom it has clothed 
with the trappings of authority and then determine at a later time whether the consequences of 
their acts offer an advantage.”33 Apparent authority enables third parties to proceed on the basis 
                                                
29Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) (ULPA) § 402. 
30Id. § 302. 
31Revised Limited Liability Company Act (2006) (RULLCA) § 301, cmt. at 49 (2011). 
 
32ULPA § 108 (c).This requirement has a counterpart in corporate law. See, e.g., Del. 
Code Ann., tit. 8, § 102(a)(1). 
   
33Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03, cmt. c.  
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of principals’ manifestations about agents’ authority unless reasonably under the circumstances 
the third party should inquire further. Many cases apply the elements of apparent authority to 
determine whether incorporated principals are bound by acts taken purportedly on their behalves 
by agents of all sorts, including their officers.34 In contrast, giving operative effect to restrictions 
in a document—an operating agreement—that is not a matter of public record requires third 
parties to seek formal confirmation of authority in circumstances well beyond the operation of 
common-law agency doctrines.35 Separately, some LLC statutes decouple the power of members 
or managers to bind the firm from limitations comparable to those imposed by ULLCA and 
partnership statutes, thereby creating the possibility that the LLC would be bound by an 
unauthorized act that was wrongful, or not in the ordinary course of the LLC’s business, or 
effected through means not typical of the LLC.36 These outcomes, too, are at odds with common-
law agency because each scenario makes it likely that the third party did not act reasonably, as 
apparent authority requires.         
 As it happens, the Delaware LLC statute may pose both of these problems, providing as it 
does  in section 18-402 that “[u]nless otherwise provided in a limited liability company 
agreement, each member and manager has the authority to bind the limited liability company.”37 
                                                
34See Restatement (Third) of Agency §§ 3.03 cmts. c-e & rep. notes. 
35Moreover, if an LLC lacks an equivalent for the secretarial function customary in 
corporations, obtaining formal confirmation of authority may be more difficult. On the 
customary authority of corporate secretaries to certify the due adoption of resolutions and to 
certify officers’ signatures, see Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.03, cmt. e(5). A functional 
solution for LLCs is filing a statement of authority. See RULLCA § 302(a)(2), discussed infra. 
 
36Bishop & Kleinberger ¶14.04[3][a] at 14-115-16. 
37Del. Code Ann., tit. 6, § 18-402. 
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As many LLCs organize under Delaware law but have their principal places of business 
elsewhere,38 arguable ambiguities in statutory language affecting basic issues are significant. For 
starters, in what sense would a member or manager have “authority” to bind the firm if the 
limited liability company agreement provides otherwise? “Authority” here must mean positional 
power, as discussed above, to avoid inconsistency within the same sentence. But notice the 
power’s breadth, unrestricted as it is by partnership-like statutory limitations.39  
 Perhaps to mitigate the risks of a statutorily-uncabined power to bind an LLC, section 18-
402 couples the conferral of power with the “unless otherwise provided” prelude, which makes 
the conferred powers subject to the LLC’s limited liability company agreement, a private 
document not filed with the state. Read literally, “unless otherwise provided” detaches Delaware 
LLCs from the operation of apparent authority, creating the possibility that an LLC may deal 
with third parties through members and managers who bear titles or are otherwise placed in 
positions that would lead a reasonable third party to believe that the member or manager’s actual 
authority matches the manifestation made by the LLC through the title or placement, subject to 
being confounded by restrictions in the LLC agreement of which the third party had no notice. 
 Experts—lawyers who attended a 2006 meeting of the ABA’s Business Section 
Partnership Committee—reportedly exhibited “significant confusion” about the meaning of this 
portion of the Delaware statute.40 A few read the sentence to address only actual authority, to be 
governed by the operating agreement, with the consequence that the statute itself confers no 
                                                
38Gevurtz at 67. 
39Bishop & Kleinberger ¶ 14.04[3][a] at 14-115. 
40Frost at 11. 
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apparent authority “but regular principles of agency law apply” and make apparent authority 
available to third parties to bind the LLC.41 Reading further into the statute, its final provision 
may support this reading because it makes applicable “the rules of law and equity” to “any case 
not provided for in this chapter ....”42 On the other hand, Delaware’s statute does not explicitly 
make the common law of agency applicable,43 and arguably “the case” is “provided for” by 
section 18-402. Reportedly, many Delaware lawyers treat section 18-402 to mean “that third 
parties may not assume that a member or manager of a Delaware LLC ever has apparent 
authority...the statute specifically provides the operating agreement governs authority, period.”44 
Scholarly authority acknowledges that section 18-402 could be read both ways.45  
 Separately, policy commitments explicitly articulated in the statute weigh in favor of 
confining section 18-402 and the impact of an LLC’s operating agreement to actual authority. 
Delaware’s LLC statute expressly states that “[i]t is the policy of this chapter to give the 
maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited 
liability company agreements.”46 Basic contract law limits a contract’s legal consequences to the 
                                                
41Frost at 47. 
42Del. Code Ann., tit. 6, § 18-1104. 
43As does N.C. Gen. Stat. § 57D-2-30(e), discussed infra. 
44Frost at 47. 
45Ribstein et al. at 161 (statute “arguably makes the operating agreement control both 
actual and apparent authority of members and managers, but it could also be argued that the 
default rule conferring on each member and manager authority to bind the LLC confers apparent 
authority on one who does not know of a contrary provision in the operating agreement”); 
Bishop & Kleinberger ¶ 14.04[3][a] at 14-115 (characterizing “authority” as ambiguous). 
 
46Del. Code Ann., tit. 6, §18-1101(b). 
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parties to the contract and to a limited cast of further characters, in particular third parties who 
have enforceable rights to benefit from performance of the contract. A commitment to “the 
principle of freedom of contract” implicitly demarcates parties to a contract from non-parties; the 
principle is not equivalent to deeming the world at large to know the contract’s terms.47 Even 
more startling than the confused state of Delaware LLC law, in some states statutes explicitly 
provided that an LLC is not bound by the act of a member or manager that contravenes the 
operating agreement although the third party is unaware of the restriction and acts reasonably.48 
Less extreme language elsewhere still deems third parties to have knowledge of restrictions on a 
member or manager’s authority when the LLC’s articles of organization—filed with the state—
state that the operating agreement contains restrictions.49  
 More generally, it is not evident what policy objective is furthered by holding third 
parties  who deal reasonably to the consequences of contractual terms of which they had no 
notice. Many dealings by LLCs, like those of businesses more generally, are “quotidian” and do 
not reasonably invite inquiry beyond the generally-understood manifestations about its 
representatives made by the entity with whom third parties deal.50 Proceeding on the basis that 
                                                
47For an example of statutory language accepting this point, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 57D-2-
30(b)(2)(LLC’s operating agreement not applicable to persons not party to agreement or 
otherwise bound by it).  
 
48To this effect were Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 7-80-406(4), and Iowa Code § 
490A.702(3)(b), both since repealed. 
   
49La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1317(B). See also former Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 18, § 2019C, 
which provided that “[p]ersons dealing with members or managers of the limited liability 
company shall be deemed to have knowledge of the restrictions on the authority of members or 
managers contained in a written operating agreement if the articles of organization of the limited 
liability company contain a statement that such restrictions exist.” 
 
50RULLCA, Prefatory Note at 4.  
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“the operating agreement governs authority, period”51 whether or not a third party has notice of 
its terms appears only to arm transactional parties that happen to be LLCs with an extra-
contractual option to repudiate commitments made by their representatives that is unavailable to 
businesses otherwise organized, which is likely to surprise reasonable third parties when the LLC 
deploys the option at a later time to avoid the legal consequences of its representative’s actions.           
 
4. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
Formal statutory reforms 
 Statutory drafters are aware of the problems identified in this Chapter, in particular the 
experts charged with drafting the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA), 
which was completed in 2006. RULLCA’s solution is elegant and precise. It achieves clarity by 
jettisoning the partnership legacy of positional powers and by reattaching LLC law to common-
law agency.  RULLCA section 301(a)52 provides that “[a] member is not an agent of a limited 
liability company solely by reason of being a member.”53 This language makes it unnecessary to 
clarify the relationship(s) between a partner’s positional power, actual authority, and apparent 
authority. A reader might then wonder how an LLC might ever be bound, if the LLC lacks 
managers, in the absence of members’ positional power; subsection (b) answers the question by 
providing that “[a] member’s status as a member does not prevent or restrict law other than this 
[act] from imposing liability on a limited liability company because of the person’s conduct,” 
                                                
51Frost at 47. 
52Lest a superficial reader miss the point, the title of the section is: “NO AGENCY 
POWER OF MEMBER AS MEMBER.” 
 
53RULLCA § 301(a). 
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which acknowledges that through the application of agency law a member of an LLC may 
become an agent.54 Under RULLCA an LLC is member-managed unless its operating agreement 
provides otherwise.55 In a member-managed LLC, acts outside the ordinary course of business 
require the consent of all members,56 as would be true in a general partnership. Like RUPA, 
RULLCA permits an LLC to file a statement of authority with the secretary of state or 
comparable official but it may designate positions, not just persons.57 With stated exceptions 
(including filings concerning authority to transfer real property), a statement of authority “is not 
by itself evidence of knowledge of notice of the limitation by any person.58 Nothing in RULLCA 
makes restrictions of authority contained in LLC operating agreements effective as against third 
parties who deal with the LLC, in particular third parties who lack notice of the restriction.  
 Under RULLCA, as for incorporated business entities, much work is assigned to the 
doctrine of apparent authority. For example, designating someone as a “manager” likely 
implicates the power to bind the LLC as to matters within the ordinary course of business.59 
                                                
54The language might helpfully have acknowledged that an agent’s conduct may also lead 
to legally-enforceable rights that the principal may wish to exercise as against third parties with 
whom the agent dealt. 
 
55RULLCA §407(a). 
56RULLCA § 407(b)(4). 
57RULLCA § 302 (a)(2). 
58RULLCA § 302(d). The other exceptions concern notice of an LLC’s dissolution, 
termination, or merger or the like transaction, effective within 90 days after the relevant 
statement or articles have been filed; and the filing of a post-dissolution statement of authority. 
RULLCA §§ 103(d) and 302 (d). 
 
59Frost at 47. RULLCA itself provides in § 407(c)(3) that in a manager-managed LLC, “a 
difference arising among managers as to a matter in the ordinary course of the activities of the 
company may be decided by a majority of the managers.” This language contemplates that a 
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Conferring a title such as “President” on a member or a manager implicates a large body of 
common-law precedent focused on the meanings ordinarily associated with formal 
organizational titles, as would conferring a title that designates a functional area or specialty 
within the LLC. To be sure, RULLCA itself does not address all questions that may surface as a 
consequence of jettisoning members’ positional power. For example, might a newly-formed LLC 
be “stymied” if it has not yet filed any statement of authority, and its operating agreement does 
not confer titles that denote authority to interact with third parties?60 The new LLC seems to lack 
any agents at all, which may protect its members against liability to third parties until the 
members reach agreement, but may also come as a surprise to third parties who deal with the 
LLC through a member. Backdrop agency law seems likely to fill this lacuna for an LLC with a 
governance structure that is incomplete or a work-in-progress. Recall that the RULLCA default 
is member-management. All members in a default member-managed LLC have “equal rights in 
the management and conduct” of the LLC’s activities,61 and section 407(b)(3) provides that a 
dispute among members on a matter “within the ordinary course of the activities of the company 
may be decided by a majority of the members.” It’s likely that the new LLC’s members have 
some understanding of the point of forming it; if the member who acts takes action that the 
member reasonably understands to further the LLC’s objective(s), the member has acted with 
actual authority unless on notice that other members object or would object if they but knew of 
                                                                                                                                                       
“manager” handles matters that arise in the ordinary course of an LLC’s activity. 
 
60Rutledge & Frost at 51. 
61RULLCA § 407(b)(2). 
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the action the member intends to take.62   
 Alternatively, a statute might retain a partnership-derived conferral of positional power 
on LLC members but include provisions that mitigate its consequences. A recent (post-
RULLCA) LLC statute, effective as of January 2014 in North Carolina, is an intriguing 
example.63 Section 3-20(a) vests management of North Carolina LLCs in managers,64 followed 
by section 3-20(d), which provides that all members are managers “by virtue of their status as 
members ....” unless the operating agreement provides otherwise,65 for example by designating 
less than all members as managers or designating non-members as the LLC’s sole managers. 
Thus, member-management is the default option but the operating agreement may specify 
otherwise. Under section 3-20 (c) “each manager may act on behalf of the LLC in the ordinary 
course of its business” subject to direction and control of a majority of managers. As with the 
                                                
62Rutledge & Frost at 52. The resolution for the new-LLC hypothetical, introduced in this 
article, proposes a slight variant, which is that the member in question “has actual authority to 
take actions the member reasonably believes are necessary or incidental to achieving the 
objectives of the LLC so long as the member is not aware of any differing belief among the 
members and the act is within the ordinary course of the activities of the LLC.” Id. My proposed 
analysis is narrower by a smidgen: a member who anticipates that fellow members may well 
object would have an incentive to act before fellow members are clued in to the action the 
member plans to take. Perhaps the member harboring such a suspicion would not also 
“reasonably believe” that what the member does is necessary or incidental to the LLC’s 
objectives, but the analytic focus within agency law in determining whether an agent acted with 
actual authority is consistency with the principal’s known manifestations, which include 
“circumstances of which the agent has notice and the agent’s fiduciary duty to the principal.” 
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.02(2). A reasonable person in the agent’s situation, with the 
new LLC as a principal, might be on notice of the “circumstance” of the agent’s own suspicions 
about the principal, that is, the likely objection by fellow LLC members.  
  
63For an overview of the statute from the chair of the bar committee that drafted the act, 
see Keen. 
 
64N.C. Gen. Stats. ch. 57D, § 3-20(a). 
65Id. § 3-20(d). 
  
-21- 
Delaware LLC statute, the first question posed by these provisions is whether a 
member/manager’s status-derived power to “act on behalf of the LLC in the ordinary course of 
its business” is subject to any further constraints, if the act is in the “ordinary course” of the 
LLC’s business. Would the member/manager’s power to bind encompass acts known to the third 
party to represent self-dealing transactions or acts effected through atypical means? Section 2-
30(e) makes applicable “the laws of agency and contract” unless provided otherwise in the 
statute, but this section explicitly addresses only the “administration and enforcement of 
operating agreements.”66 If the third party has notice of terms in the operating agreement that 
restrict a manager’s authority (including the authority of a member/manager), neither actual nor 
apparent authority would enable the third party to hold the LLC to the legal consequences of the 
manager’s unauthorized act. But one wonders whether apparent-authority principles limit the 
status-derived power of a member to bind an LLC to a transaction that would reasonably appear 
to a third party not to be authorized based on the nature of the transaction or the means through 
which the member effects it, when the third party has no notice of any limitations imposed by the 
operating agreement. Perhaps such a transaction is assumed not to be in “the ordinary course” of 
the LLC’s business, but this may require heavy lifting by “ordinary course.” 
 In contrast with the Delaware statute, the North Carolina statute is clear about the impact 
of provisions in an operating agreement that restrict authority. Under section 2-30(b)(2), an 
operating agreement “does not apply” to persons “who are not parties or otherwise bound by the 
operating agreement.”67 A third party, neither a party to an operating agreement nor bound by it 
                                                
66Id. § 2-30(e). 
67Id. § 2-30(b)(2). 
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as the statute specifies,68 would be a party to whom the operating agreement “does not apply ...” 
Admittedly, stating that an operating agreement “does not apply” to a person is not precisely the 
same as stating that the person is not deemed to be on notice of its contents; but notably the 
North Carolina statute omits any language deeming all who may deal with or otherwise 
encounter an LLC to have knowledge of the terms of its operating agreement. And to preserve 
the potential of apparent authority as a limiting constraint on unauthorized actions, it’s important 
that the statute does not state that non-parties are not “affected by” the agreement.         
Non-statutory solutions  
 By this point in the Chapter, two facts may puzzle the reader. First, only a small number 
of cases address the problems identified in this Chapter in the LLC context. Second, statutory 
fixes to the problems are either in their early days or limited in number. To date, seven states and 
the District of Columbia have adopted RULLCA; the North Carolina statute is both new and 
distinctive. One explanation for the evident stickiness of problematic statutory language is that 
other factors suppress or mitigate the occurrence of problems, including the fact that most 
transactions entered into on behalf of LLCs “transpire without agency issues being recognized by 
the parties, let alone disputed.69 Further explanations for stickiness stem from judicial decisions 
and interpretations of the law by expert lawyers that can mitigate problematic statutory language. 
 For Delaware LLCs, opinions from Delaware courts make it clear that, in one scholarly 
                                                
68Under section 2-31 (a) & (b), non-parties bound by the operating agreement are the 
LLC itself and interest holders, who under section 1-03(15) are defined to include members and 
non-members who hold economic interests in the LLC. 
 
69RULLCA, Prefatory Note at 4. 
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assessment, “the law of agency remains alive and well in Delaware.”70 Indeed, it’s noticeable 
that neither of the two cases on point applying Delaware law refers at all to the Delaware LLC 
statute! In Jack J. Morris Assocs. v. Mispillion Street Partners, LLC, an individual co-owner of 
the LLC that constituted one of the defendant LLC’s two members was originally designated one 
of the defendant’s general managers.71 Two days before he executed a contract under which the 
plaintiff would furnish marketing services to the defendant, the defendant’s operating agreement 
was amended to remove the individual as a general manager. The defendant paid some invoices 
submitted by the plaintiff but then ceased paying. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for 
summary judgment in its suit for breach of contract, entirely relying for analytic traction on 
common-law agency. The individual testified that the defendant LLC was aware that he entered 
into the agreement with the plaintiff, which might constitute an implied grant of actual authority 
to the individual, based on whether he reasonably believed the defendant authorized him to enter 
into the agreement notwithstanding the earlier revocation of his position as a general manager. 
Separately, and requiring “factual evaluation,” was whether the individual acted with apparent 
authority, an inquiry “which must consider whether Defendant made representations to Plaintiff 
indicating that [individual] was its agent, whether Plaintiff relied on them, and whether that 
reliance was reasonable.”72 Unremarkable as an articulation of agency doctrine, the court’s 
opinion nonetheless is remarkable for the absence of any reference to the LLC statute. Perhaps 
counsel for the defendant did not think that a defense premised on the statute’s “unless otherwise 
                                                
70Bishop & Kleinberger ¶ 14.04[3][a] at 14-116. 
712008 WL 3906755 (Del. Super. Ct. May 5, 2008). 
722008 WL 3906755 at *4. 
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provided” language would be helpful.   
 In the second case, the Court of Chancery likewise did not refer to the LLC statute in 
denying motions for summary judgment; the case stemmed from an employee’s use of funds 
embezzled from his employer to buy property on behalf of an LLC in which he and another 
individual were members. In B.A.S.S. Group, LLC v. Coastal Supply Co., once the embezzlement 
came to light, the now-former employee settled with his former employer on terms that required 
transfer to the former employer of property purchased for the LLC with the embezzled funds.73 
After the embezzler effected the transfer, the LLC’s other member sued to void it, alleging that 
the embezzler lacked authority under the LLC agreement to make the transfer. The court found 
the question complicated under the LLC agreement because the embezzler, designated therein as 
the  “Authorized Person” to execute instruments on behalf of the LLC, may not have acted in 
good faith, as the agreement required. Additionally debatable on the summary judgment record 
was whether the embezzler acted with apparent authority in transferring the property to his 
former employer because it was not clear whether the employer “relied upon anything” done by 
the LLC “in formulating its arguably reasonable belief” that the embezzler acted with authority 
in transferring the LLC’s property.74 Again, unremarkable applications of common-law agency 
doctrine, but again nowhere does the opinion refer to the Delaware LLC statute. 
 These opinions may furnish the backdrop for the emergence of an arguable expert 
                                                
732009 WL 1743730 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2009). 
742009 WL 1743730 at *6. Not helping the plaintiff was the strength of the former 
employer’s counterclaim for unjust enrichment. The court held that the LLC was not a bona fide 
purchaser for value of the embezzled funds and denied summary judgment on the counterclaim 
only because the parties did not address “who should capture the upside of the Property” if any 
value remained net of the embezzled funds plus interest. Id. at * 7. 
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consensus about the relationship between Delaware’s LLC statute and the common-law doctrine 
of apparent authority, a consensus at odds with the reported reactions of Delaware counsel as of 
2006 reported earlier in this Chapter. Such a consensus could reinforce the impact of the judicial 
decisions to date as well as predict the likely outcome of future litigation. In 2014, the 
Committee on LLCs, Partnerships, and Unincorporated Entities of the ABA’s Business Law 
section75 prepared and published a form LLC agreement for single-individual-member LLCs 
organized under Delaware law.76 Addressing management of the LLC, the form (inter alia) 
permits delegation by the member to other persons or entities, with such titles as the member 
may elect, of “the power and authority to act on behalf of the Company as the Member may 
delegate in writing to any such person or entity.”77 Recall that one literal reading of the Delaware 
statute is that provisions in an operating agreement (termed an LLC agreement under Delaware 
law) exclusively specify the power, as well as the actual authority, to bind the LLC. Inconsistent 
with this reading is footnote 15 to this portion of the form, which notes that “while appointed 
persons or entities will only have actual authority as set forth in this Agreement, they may 
nevertheless have apparent agency authority, including perhaps apparent authority to bind the 
LLC as a third party would reasonably ascribe to the titles given.”78 In light of the authors’ 
professional and institutional stature, the form’s inclusion of apparent authority as a possible 
                                                
75The same committee sponsored the meeting that generated multiple interpretations of 
Delaware’s statute in 2006. See Frost at 11. 
 
76Single-member LLCs “once suspect because novel ..., are now popular both for sole 
proprietorships and as corporate subsidiaries.” RULLCA, Prefatory Note at 1.  
 
77Id. item 5.1 (iii). 
78Id. at 780 n. 15, citing Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03. 
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basis on which an LLC may be bound by an unauthorized act may represent an informed 
professional consensus inclined to reject an interpretation of statutory language disconnected on 
this issue from the common law.     
5. CONCLUSION 
 External agency is essential to the capacity of any business entity to engage in business 
dealings with other entities and with individuals. Perhaps the relatively settled nature of 
common-law agency makes it all the more surprising that the most basic agency question of 
all— the power to bind a firm—has been so muddled over the history of LLC statutes and is 
treated ambiguously in the Delaware LLC statute. This Chapter demonstrates that the muddle is 
avoidable. RULLCA achieves clarity by jettisoning the partnership-derived concept of positional 
powers and by affirmatively embracing the common law to resolve agency questions. Separately, 
a statute might retain powers of position for LLC members and managers but also specify—as do 
partnership statutes—the circumstances under which an unauthorized act would bind the LLC, 
while also specifying that restrictions on authority contained in operating agreements do not 
affect the legal position of a third party who lacks knowledge or notice of the restrictions.    
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